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Abstract
As carbon sinks, forests play a critical role in helping to mitigate the growing threat
from anthropogenic climate change. Forest carbon oﬀsets transacted between GHG emit-
ters in industrialised countries and sellers in developing countries have emerged as a
useful climate policy tool. A model is developed that investigates the role of incentives in
forestry carbon sequestration contracts. It considers the optimal design of contracts to en-
sure landowner participation and hence, permanence in forest carbon sinks in a context of
uncertain opportunity costs and incomplete contract enforcement. The optimal contract
is driven by the quality of the institutional framework in which the contract is executed, in
particular, as it relates to contract enforcement. Stronger institutional frameworks tend
to distort the seller’s eﬀort upwards away from the full enforcement outcome. This also
leads to greater amounts of carbon sequestered and higher conditional payments made to
the seller. Further, where institutions are strong, there is a case for indexing the payment
to the carbon market price if permanence is to be ensured. That is, as the carbon price
increases, the payment could be raised and vice versa.
JEL codes: K12; Q15
Keywords: forest carbon oﬀsets; permanence; contract design; incomplete enforcement
∗Corresponding author: E-mail: charles.palmer@env.ethz.ch (C. Palmer). Phone: +41 44 632 32 25
11 Introduction
Anthropogenic warming of the earth’s climate system as a result of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions is a growing threat to people, economies and the environment (Stern, 2007). To
help mitigate climate change, activities in land use and forestry through aﬀorestation and
reforestation (AR), forest management and avoided deforestation, have an important role to
play in future climate change policy (Eliasch, 2008). In particular, carbon dioxide emissions
from tropical deforestation account for up to a ﬁfth of annual global GHG emissions (see
Baumert et al., 2005).1 Due to a variety of risks and uncertainties, one of the most pertinent
issues in the eﬃcacy of using forestry carbon as a mitigation strategy is that of ‘permanence’
(Eliasch, 2008; Dutschke and Angelsen, 2008; Palmer and Engel, 2009).2 That is, for forestry
carbon to be successful, projects must ensure the permanence of carbon oﬀsets throughout the
duration of the contract. This must be resolved if forestry carbon is to be adopted on a wider
scale than it is at present, e.g. in a post-2012 international climate regime (UNFCCC, 2007).
An important question is how optimal carbon sequestration contracts could be created to
ensure permanence in a variety of institutional frameworks and how this might diﬀer from
standard contracts (e.g. environmental service contracts). In this paper, we show how optimal
contracts are designed under diﬀerent institutional frameworks for contract enforcement, e.g.
legal systems and enforcement mechanisms. Such frameworks in least-developed countries tend
to be weaker relative to industrialised and some emerging economies. We ﬁnd that, to ensure
permanence in a context of weak contract enforcement and uncertain opportunity costs, the
optimal, self-enforcing contract is strongly dependent on the quality of institutional framework
in a given place.
We develop a forestry carbon contract in the form of an AR scheme. Project-based AR
transactions occur when a buyer such as a government or ﬁrm from an advanced economy, e.g.
from an Annex I country under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, invests
in a carbon sequestration scheme in a developing or emerging economy, and receives emissions
credits in return. Carbon sellers originate in countries characterised by wide variation in the
1Inclusion of GHG emissions from forest degradation expands this deﬁnition to REDD: ‘Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Degradation’.
2Forestry carbon is particularly vulnerable to natural risks (e.g. pests and diseases, climate change), an-
thropogenic risks (e.g. encroachment, land management), political risks (e.g. weak property rights, non-
enforcement), economic and ﬁnancial risks (e.g. exchange rate ﬂuctuations, changing opportunity costs), and
institutional risks (Watson et al., 2000).
2quality and robustness of institutional frameworks necessary for contract enforcement. Under
Kyoto, the predominant contractual arrangement that has evolved is a simple purchase contract
known as the Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA).3 These contracts in addition
to those made in the small but rapidly growing voluntary carbon markets rarely provide upfront
investments to potential sellers (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2007; 2008; Jindal et al., 2008). The
extent and number of AR schemes have, however, been limited by this lack of upfront ﬁnancing,
alongside constraints on demand formalised under Kyoto and the latter’s stringent regulatory
regime (UNEP, 2004).
Without upfront ﬁnancing, AR projects in developing countries struggle to get implemented.
Poorer landowners and farmers typically lack collateral necessary for third-party ﬁnancing.
Given insecure property rights in many developing countries, even land cannot be used as
collateral (see, for example, Feder and Feeny, 1991). Furthermore, poor governance and in-
complete enforcement in these countries implies that carbon buyers may be reluctant to make
upfront investments in forestry projects. Incomplete contract enforcement in turn suggests
that it might be very diﬃcult to ensure the maintenance or permanence of forest carbon sinks
over the duration of the contract should there be a risk of opportunistic contract breach. Op-
portunistic contract breach might occur, for example, when the seller’s opportunity costs are
uncertain and rise after contracting leading to a reversal of the forest carbon sink.
Ensuring the permanence of newly-created forest carbon sinks has mainly been investigated
using risk management, pricing and accounting approaches. The former include specialised
carbon-pooling vehicles, and reinsurance approaches (see Bayon et al., 2007, for a review),
while the latter is more concerned with institutional design (e.g. Dutschke, 2002; Kim et al.,
2008). Risk management and liability in forestry carbon contracts have also been considered
at the aggregate, i.e. national, in addition to the individual level (Eliasch, 2008). However,
relatively little research has been undertaken on how contracts between buyers and sellers could
be eﬃciently designed to ensure permanence (Dutschke and Angelsen, 2008). The second im-
portant issue is that the possibility of contract breach depends on the uncertain and changing
opportunity cost. Benitez et al. (2006) considered changing opportunity costs by applying
stochastic dominance rules to identify the payments needed to prevent land-use changes that
reduces biodiversity in developing countries. One important implication of their analysis was
3A transaction that transfers carbon credits between two parties under the Kyoto Protocol.
3that alongside incorporating risk-hedging strategies and insurance possibilities for small farm-
ers, conservation payments to a farmer could be made dependent on the agricultural revenue
generated by his farm. The eﬀectiveness of this approach, however, rests upon the ability of
the buyer to observe the farmer’s opportunity costs.4
In this paper, we create a new framework in order to model forest carbon contract incen-
tives in the context of price volatility in agricultural commodities’ markets. Our framework
allows for a variety of institutional frameworks for contract enforcement. Potential changes in
the seller’s opportunity costs are anticipated at the time of contracting but only realise after
the contract is already signed. We take into account that these changes are not necessarily
observable to the buyer. Given the potential for landowners’ opportunity costs to change and
incomplete contract enforcement, we consider the design of optimal carbon contracts to ensure
landowner participation and hence, permanence in the provision of forestry carbon beneﬁts
over the duration of the contract.5 We develop a simple, static contract between the principal,
a carbon buyer such as a government, ﬁrm or NGO looking to oﬀset GHG emissions originating
in an advanced economy and the agent, a seller in a less-developed economy. In our setting,
the seller can be characterised as a landowner, local community or government, which has lim-
ited liability with respect to the contract. The consideration of a static contract enables us to
analyse the impact of the buyer’s demand for permanence on incentives contained within the
contract and hence, on the seller’s land use behaviour with respect to the contract.
The buyer and seller contract ex ante on an upfront payment along with a payment made
conditional on carbon delivery. We model the upfront payment as a productive transfer, one
that is not only productive in carbon sequestration but also productive in the seller’s outside
option. Permanence, incomplete contract enforcement and limited liability are modelled as
constraints restricting the buyer’s optimisation programme. We ﬁnd a driving force in the
optimal contract is the institutional framework in which the contract is executed. We show
that a contract that ensures permanence under incomplete enforcement is likely to lead to a
distortion in the level of contracted eﬀort made by the seller. In particular, stronger and more
4There is a considerable body of research on contracting in agriculture and in the provision of environmental
services, which tend to focus on the role of information asymmetries in outcomes (e.g. Bourgeon et al., 1995;
Wu and Babcock, 1995;1996; Moxey et al., 1999; Ozanne et al., 2001; Feng, 2007).
5We assume a policy goal of carbon retention in biomass over several decades. During this time, technological
changes may reduce the costs of alternative mitigation options thus enabling substitution from forestry carbon
sinks to these other options (Chomitz et al., 2006). CDM guidelines propose that Land Use, land Use Change
and Forestry (LULUCF) projects have a duration of between 20 and 60 years (Harris et al., 2009).
4robust institutional frameworks tend to distort the seller’s eﬀort upwards away from the full-
enforcement outcome. Ensuring permanence in the contract thus implies more eﬀort needs to be
expended by the carbon provider or seller, although this also leads to greater amounts of carbon
sequestered and higher conditional payments made to the seller. Furthermore, in a context of
relatively strong institutions, we ﬁnd an increase in conditional payments as the value of the
marginal oﬀset increases. This suggests potential for indexing conditional payments to carbon
prices in order ensure permanence. That is, as the carbon price increases, the conditional
payment could be raised. Where institutions are relatively weak, on the other hand, less eﬀort
is required but less carbon is sequestered and with lower payments made to sellers. Moreover,
indexing is less likely to be eﬀective. With the provision of upfront payments, permanence can
still be ensured even in a context of incomplete contract enforcement.
Our contribution is threefold. Firstly, ensuring permanence within a carbon sequestration
contract has allowed us to create a unique contract framework that guarantees contract en-
forceability and provides for an upfront payment that is both productive, in terms of carbon
sequestration, and with respect to the opportunity cost of the seller. Incomplete contract en-
forcement is not considered in other frameworks such as the one developed by Benitez et al.
(2006). Second, the optimal contract shows the menu of contract options that help to ensure
permanence. Given the potential cost-eﬀectiveness of forest-based carbon sequestration as a
climate change mitigation strategy (Chomitz et al., 2006; Lubowski et al., 2006; Stern, 2006;
Eliasch, 2008, Palmer and Engel, 2009), ensuring permanence would be important to realise
forestry carbon beneﬁts over a time-scale of decades. Third, other than carbon sequestration,
our model has potential applications to other environmental contracts whether considered con-
ceptually or in practice. Permanence is an issue that applies more widely to the preservation
of environmental services over time, and is not just a problem for carbon sinks per se (see, for
example, Swart, 2003; McCauly, 2006; Engel et al., 2008).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
formally describes the constraints on the seller. Section 3 discusses the principal’s optimal
choice of contract while section 4 investigates the impacts of the carbon market price on the
optimal contract. Section 5 discusses the model results, and some policy implications and ideas
for future research are presented in section 6.
52 The model
To focus on the problem of permanence within forestry projects we consider a purchase contract
between a project developer and a buyer of emission oﬀsets. Both, buyer and seller are assumed
to be risk neutral.6 The buyer may be a ﬁrm attempting to comply with its obligations to reduce
its GHG emissions within an emissions trading market, a national government complying with
Kyoto Protocol requirements or even a non-governmental organisation that voluntarily but cost-
eﬀectively attempts to reduce the GHG emissions from its activities via payments for carbon
oﬀsets. The seller could represent a farmer or landowner, a local community or government, or
even a national government who has the ability to provide for the sequestration of q tonnes of
carbon dioxide through investment in forestry, such as a tree planting programme or a forest
rehabilitation scheme.7
In exchange for q tonnes of carbon the buyer oﬀers a two-tiered payment scheme consisting
of an upfront investment α and a per-unit price β, which is paid conditional on delivery. The
contract is hence assumed to be linear, which corresponds to the standard setup of Emission
Reduction Purchase Agreements (ERPA) under Kyoto.8 The upfront investment α is either a
direct transfer of capital or production inputs, e.g. seeds, land, or cash that could be used by
the seller to invest in the scheme. It can be interpreted as a true upfront investment, i.e. α is
assumed to have an positive inﬂuence on the amount of carbon produced, but is in itself not
utility relevant to the seller.9 The conditional payment β is paid to the seller on delivery of the
carbon oﬀsets.10
The amount of carbon oﬀsets q produced by the seller is a function of the (productive)
upfront payment α, and the seller’s eﬀort e, which is assumed to be observable and hence
contractible. The function q(α,e) is assumed to be concave or linear in both of its arguments.
Assuming eﬀort e ≥ 0 is not costless to the seller, the seller’s corresponding cost func-
6The presence of the limited liability constraint confers an element of risk aversion on the seller (see 2.1).
7Tree planting could involve either reforesting a previously forested area or aﬀoresting an area with no
previous forest cover. Note that aﬀorestation and reforestation projects are currently the only forestry projects
eligible within the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism.
8See, for example, Capoor and Ambrosi (2008).
9Depending on the nature of the initial investment, some proportion of it may be recoverable to the seller
after the expiry of the project. A ’recoverability’ parameter could easily be incorporated into the model to
account for this.
10Note that while we assume β to be a pecuniary transfer in our framework, some forestry carbon schemes
in developing countries may also involve the transfer of non-pecuniary beneﬁts on condition of oﬀset delivery,
for example, fuelwood and fruits (see Smith and Scherr, 2003).
6tion C(e) is assumed to be convex, continuous and diﬀerentiable in e, with C′(e),C′′(e) ≥ 0.
The costs from e can be considered sunk and therefore non-recoverable. In case of contract
performance the value of the contract to the seller is thus given by:
βq(α,e) − C(e) (1)
However, the seller’s performance of the contract is not guaranteed. Sudden increases in
commodity or rental prices that could be obtained as the next best alternative to forestry
investment imply rising opportunity costs, which might create an incentive for the seller to
breach the contract. At the moment of contracting, the level of future opportunity costs are
uncertain. This is a plausible assumption. For example, if the opportunity costs are driven by
volatile commodities’ or rental prices, the seller can reasonably be expected to be unsure of the
precise value of his outside option. We further assume that the change in opportunity costs
is not necessarily observable to the buyer. Hence, should opportunity costs increase then the
seller’s commitment to adhere to the contract instead of switching land use is questionable. To
take this uncertainty into account, future opportunity costs are modelled as a random variable
˜ z, which will be realized after the contract has been signed and the seller has incurred costs C(e).
For simplicity, we allow for two possible states of opportunity costs where ˜ z ∈ {z,z} ⊂ N0, with
z < z > z0. At the time of contracting the probability of a low level of opportunity cost z is π,
while the probability for the occurrence of z is (1 − π). It is assumed that these probabilities
are publicly known.
Contrary to standard contractual setups, we further assume that the value of opportunity
cost is positively dependent on the upfront investment α. Hence, z = z(α) with z′(α) ≥ 0. This
assumption reﬂects the fact that investing in a larger upfront payment could indirectly beneﬁt
the seller through boosting the value of his opportunity cost. Capital inputs, for example, could
be used for the production of goods and services other than carbon sequestration via forestry.
This is most obvious if the upfront payment is used by the seller to acquire additional territory
for AR projects which would potentially be of use for other agricultural purposes as well. Note
that the conditional payment β is not indexed with respect to the opportunity costs in order
to reﬂect their potential unobservability to the buyer.
If the high opportunity cost level z is realized, the seller has a potential incentive to breach
7the contract. In case of breach it is assumed that the seller reverses the carbon sink, for example,
through cutting down the forest in order to switch his land use to the more attractive alternative.
In this case the buyer will try to enforce the contract through a court order. However, it can
be reasonably assumed that the judicial system is not perfect, such that enforcement of the
contract is not guaranteed. Many developing countries where forestry carbon oﬀsets are located
tend to be plagued by corruption, poor governance, weakly deﬁned property rights, e.g. over
land and natural resources, and incomplete enforcement of rules, laws and regulations. We
take this into account by assuming that the probability of contract enforcement, denoted γ is
lower than 1. In the case where the contract is enforced by a court, the buyer receives contract
damages θ which are stipulated in the contract. With probability (1 − γ) the contract is not
enforced. In this case the buyer is not awarded any damages and loses the initial investment α.
Given the above-depicted setup, the condition for the seller’s participation in the agreement
can be derived. Under the assumption:
z(α) − γθ < βq(α,e), (2)
the seller would participate in the contract if:
πβq(α,e) + (1 − π)(γ(z(α) − θ) + (1 − γ)z(α)) − C
′(e) ≥ π · z(0) + (1 − π)z(0) (3)
The left-hand side of this constraint represents the seller’s expected gains from the contract,
including the possibility of contract breach in case the high level of opportunity costs is realized.
The latter occurs with probability (1−π). In this case the seller will gain z(α), but risks being
obliged to pay damages θ should the contract be enforced by a court. Enforcement occurs with
probability γ. The right-hand side of the constraint represents the ex ante expected utility
of the seller if the contract is not signed. In this case the opportunity costs will change with
the same probability, but as the buyer does not provide any investment the argument of the
opportunity cost function is set to zero. Constraint (3) hence ensures participation of the seller
8as his expected gains from the contract are at least as high as without the agreement.
The buyer’s payoﬀ from the contract is the net value of carbon sequestered given the payment
made to the seller in terms of upfront investment α, and the per-unit price, β. Formally, the
buyer’s payoﬀ when the contract is performed is equal to
V (q(α,e)) − α − βq(α,e) (4)
As the buyer, similar to the seller, is assumed to be risk neutral this payoﬀ corresponds, up
to a linear transformation, to the buyer’s utility. In the following, we assume that V (q) = vq.
Hence, the buyer’s value per ton of carbon or certiﬁcate is constant. This is due to the fact that
the opportunity costs to paying the contract price are not the buyer’s own marginal abatement
costs, but the market prices for identical certiﬁcates. For example, in the context of the Kyoto
regime, a buyer whose marginal abatement costs are lower than the contract price would abate
and sell the acquired CDM certiﬁcates on the market. In contrast, if the buyer’s marginal
abatement costs exceed the contract price he would use the contracted certiﬁcates for fulﬁlling
his reduction target instead of buying certiﬁcates on the market. Hence, in all cases the buyer’s
valuation of the contracted certiﬁcates will be equal to the market price for similar certiﬁcates
on the secondary CDM market.11 For the sake of simplicity, this market price for tradable
emission rights is further assumed to remain constant, or as being at least perfectly foreseeable.
Under assumption (2), the buyer’s objective function is hence:
−α + π(v − β) · q(α,e) + (1 − π) · γθ (5)
Timing and possible pay-oﬀs of the model are summarized in Figure 1. Here, it can be seen
that at t = 0, the buyer, as the principal, oﬀers a contract in which the two-tiered payment
scheme represented by α and β, the amount of carbon q, contract damages θ, and the seller’s
level of eﬀort e, are all observed and contractible. Should the seller agree to this contract,
he then immediately receives the upfront payment, α, at t = 1. At t = 2, the seller then
implements the scheme and hence, incurs a production cost, i.e. of scheme implementation, C.
Once implemented and with carbon sequestration activities underway, the seller’s opportunity
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Figure 1: Timing and outcomes of the contract
cost, e z, is realised at t = 3. The seller then makes one out of two possible choices: he can either
fulﬁll the contract or not. If he chooses to breach the contract, for example, through timber
harvesting, then he faces the possibility of contract enforcement, at t = 4.
2.1 Permanence, enforceability and liability constraints
Similar to standard complete contract frameworks, we solve for the optimal linear contract by
maximizing the buyer’s expected utility subject to several constraints. The most important
constraint is based on the assumption that the buyer is interested in the permanence of the
contracted carbon absorption through the forestry scheme. This reﬂects the current attribu-
tion of liability within the international climate policy regime. Within the context of Kyoto,
liability for replacing invalidated certiﬁcates is implicitly attributed to the buyer, as invalidated
certiﬁcates need to be replaced within the National Registry of the buyer country.12 As the
buyer country will necessarily subrogate to the project investor, we can reasonably assume that
the latter is always interested in permanence. Given the assumption of a buyer interested in
the permanence of the carbon sink over the time of contract validity, the following permanence
constraint needs to hold:
(1 − π)βq(α,e) ≥ (1 − π)(z(α) − γθ) (6)
which can be reduced to
βq(α,e) − z(α) + γθ ≥ 0 (7)
12See UNFCCC (2005), Decision 5, Annex, paragraph 55.
10Intuitively, the constraint (6) can be interpreted as follows. Should the seller’s (upper-
level) opportunity cost z realise then the seller’s expected utility under a potential non-breach
situation needs to be equal to or larger than the expected utility in case of contract breach. The
latter also includes the expected costs (to the seller) from the possibility of contract enforcement.
Hence, (7) ensures that the seller always ﬁnds it optimal to comply with the contract and
prefers to take the agreed rent rather than cashing in on his outside option. Note that a similar
constraint can be constructed for the lower level opportunity costs z, which will always hold if
(7) is fulﬁlled. This constraint resembles an ’enforcement proofness’ constraint, established by
Laﬀont and Martimort (2002). More importantly, within the current setup the constraint acts
to ensure permanence in the contracted carbon gains for the duration of the contract between
the buyer and seller.
The fact that the buyer might depend on legal courts for enforcement entails an additional
restriction to the contract, one that is generally neglected in economic contract theory. In
principle, within all modern legal systems contracts that are deemed to be exploitative are not
only non-enforceable but will also be rescinded when brought before a court.13 Within our
framework, a contract would be deemed exploitative if the seller’s pay-oﬀ from the contract is
lower than his expected reservation utility. Given these considerations, the buyer must take
into account the following enforceability constraint:
βq(α,e) − C(e) − πz(0) − (1 − π) · z(0) ≥ 0 (8)
It is easy to see that with (7) condition (2) must hold with inequality. Furthermore, the
seller’s participation constraint (3) always holds with inequality if (7) and (8) are fulﬁlled.
Hence, an enforceable contract proposed by a buyer interested in permanence implies that the
buyer always receives a positive ex-ante rent. This is an important diﬀerence to the standard
case usually considered in the theory of complete contracts where full enforcement of feasible
agreements is assumed a priori.
In our setting, an upfront payment is required due to the fact that the seller’s access to the
13The design of contracts to provide for possible uncertain contingencies and remedies for breach is considered
in some depth in the law and economics literature (for example, see Shavell, 1980; 1984). Apart from an obvious
dysfunction of the court system, the case of where no damages are paid by the seller could also occur where
the various costs of seeking damages are large enough to render doing so impractical. In our setting, there may
also be ethical reasons for courts to rescind potentially exploitative contracts between poor-country sellers and
rich-country buyers.
11credit market is assumed to be restricted. This is due to the reasonable assumption that the
seller has only very limited assets and hence, a lack of collateral. In turn, this suggests that
the level of contract damages potentially payable by the seller is restricted as well. To reﬂect
this, the following altered limited liability constraint must hold:
l + δα ≥ θ (9)
This constraint places a limit on the feasible transfers between the buyer and the seller. It
states that the damages payable by the seller need to be smaller or equal to his own net asset
holding l, plus a multiple of the upfront payment, δα. The δ is a scaling factor for contract
damages, and can be either larger than, equal to, or lower than 1. For example, when δ = 1 and
l = 0, equation (9) requires that stipulated contract damages θ should not exceed the seller’s
upfront investment. In legal terms this level is typically referred to as ’restitution damages’. We
hence extend the standard concept of a limited liability constaint to reﬂect also limitations to
contract damages which are set by the host country’s contract law and jurisprudence. Evidently,
if l = 0 the damages payable δα cannot be larger than the seller’s gains from contract breach,
i.e. z(α). We return to δ and its role in the optimal contract in the following section.14 A ﬁnal
non-negativity constraint is introduced on eﬀort of the seller, e:
e ≥ 0 (10)
3 The principal’s optimal choice of contract
Having established the restrictions the buyer has to take into account when proposing a con-
tract, we can now proceed to derive the optimal contract. In order to obtain the buyer’s optimal
contract, the following Programme (P) is solved:
14Note that limited liability could also be interpreted as an indirect expression of risk-aversion on the part of
the seller, as her downside risk from breach is limited. Further on this interpretation of limited liability, see for
example Horvath and Woywode (2005).
12max
α,β,e
(5), subject to (7), (8),(9) and (10)
The corresponding Lagrangian for Program (P) is:
L(α,β,e) = −α + π(v(q(α,e) − βq(α,e)) + (1 − π)γθ
+φ[e]
+µ[βq(α,e) − z(α) + γθ]
+λ[βq(α,e) − C(e) − πz(0) − (1 − π)z(0)]
+ψ[l + δα − θ]
where φ, µ, λ, and ψ are the Lagrange multipliers for the eﬀort, permanence, enforceability,




= −1 + (v − β)πqα + λβqα + µ(βqα − z
′(α)) + ψδ = 0 (11)
∂L
∂e
= (v − β)πqe + λ(βqe − C
′(e)) + µβqe + φ = 0 (12)
∂L
∂β
= −π + λ + µ = 0 (13)
∂L
∂θ
= (1 − π)γ + µγ − ψ = 0 (14)
From (11) and (14) we obtain:
λ =
1 − γδ − πvqα + πz′
−γδ + z′ (15)
where λ is positive if z′(α) is large enough. Substitution of λ in (13) yields:
µ =
−1 + (1 − π)γδ + πvqα
−γδ + z′ (16)
If µ > 0 and λ > 0 it follows directly from (14) that ψ > 0. Note that there exist parameter
combinations for which each constraint is either slack or binding, which entails diﬀerent possible
constrained optima. A suﬃcient condition for the permanence constraint to hold with equality
13is that z′(α) is large enough and that the expected marginal gross gain from the contract πvqa
is larger than or close enough to the marginal costs in α, i.e. 1. This is a realistic case and
will be assumed throughout the paper. The enforceability constraint will bind if the diﬀerence
in marginal gains in α between the buyer (in case of contract performance, i.e. vqα) and for
the seller (in case of breach, i.e. z′(α)) is slightly smaller than zero. Such a case might, for
example, arise if the seller’s outside option is driven by rising timber prices, rendering the
premature harvest of the forest almost as proﬁtable as preserving it as a carbon sink.15 Finally,
if λ is positive then the non-negativity constraint e ≥ 0 might become binding as well. This
will, however, only be the case for relatively high values of C′(e).
In the following, we consider the case where the permanence and enforceability constraints
are binding while the contracted eﬀort level is strictly larger than zero. We thus assume that the
corresponding above-depicted conditions hold accordingly. In this case, the optimal contract
is deﬁned by (7), (8), and (9), each holding with equality. Note that this system can only be
solved explicitly for α if a functional form for z(α) is speciﬁed. We assume that the upper-level
of opportunity costs increases linearly with the ex-ante upfront payment:
z(α) = n + mα (17)
where n,m ≥ 0 are exogenous parameters. From (17), the upper-level opportunity cost is
increasing in the upfront initial transfer. Note that with a linear functional form the concavity
of program (P) is ensured.
Using (8), (7), and (9) where each holds with equality, we can derive the second-best optimal
levels of α and β. The optimal contract is given by the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 The optimal contract, given by the 3-tuple (α∗∗,β∗∗,θ∗∗), is:
α
∗∗ =








lm + C(e)δ − πnδ
m − γδ
15Note that even if z′ becomes larger than the carbon certiﬁcate price on the market, v, contract breach might
not be eﬃcient from a welfare perspective, as the latter might well lie below the actual social costs of carbon.
14From Proposition 1, ﬁrst note that for any given cost level C(e0) both the optimal upfront
payment α∗∗ and the optimal penalty θ∗∗ are explicitly determined. The optimal conditional
payment β∗∗ is, however, ambiguous due to the generalised production function for carbon
sequestration, q(α∗∗,e). As expected, the seller’s production costs C(e) plays an important role
in determining all aspects of the optimal contract. Given an increase in costs, the buyer would
increase the ex-ante payment and the penalty for contract breach. Moreover, both the ex ante
payment and penalty are increasing in the seller’s collateral, l. Throughout we assume that
m−γδ > 0, which can be interpreted as the seller’s marginal net beneﬁt of cheating should he
decide to breach the contract, i.e. under contract enforcement, when α > 0. It can easily be
seen that both the optimal upfront payment and the penalty for breach are decreasing in the
seller’s marginal net beneﬁt of cheating.
One key term is δ, the scaling factor for contract damages in case of contract breach. As δ
increases the seller’s marginal beneﬁt from contract breach declines. This is quite intuitive as
the deterrence from breaching will necessarily increase if contract damages are allowed to be
set to higher levels.
Given we now have derived explicit functions for the optimal contract, we now turn to the
seller’s optimal level of eﬀort.
3.1 The second-best optimal eﬀort level
As is clear from Proposition 1, the eﬀort level chosen by the seller e∗∗ will determine at what
level the 3-tuple contract is set. Therefore, in order to provide a complete characterisation
of the optimal second-best contract, it is necessary to determine the seller’s second-best eﬀort
level. To solve for the optimal contracted eﬀort made by the seller e∗∗ we substitute the 3-tuple
(α∗∗,β∗∗,θ∗∗) derived in Proposition 1 into the buyer’s objective function (5) and consider the
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1 + πm − γδ
(18)
which implicitly deﬁnes the second-best level of eﬀort, e∗∗. Note that as we assume the perma-
nence constraint and the enforceability constraint to be binding, both the enumerator as well
as the denominator on the right hand side of (18) are strictly positive.







Note that this assumption is quite plausible and can for example be proven to hold when
qe(α,e∗∗) is speciﬁed as a Cobb-Douglas function. Assumption 1 is particularly useful for a
further discussion of the contracted eﬀort level. Under this assumption and from the quotient
rule it is straightforward that
C′(e∗∗)
qe(α(C(e)),e∗∗) is convex in e∗∗. We use this insight for a comparison
of the second best eﬀort level to the level of eﬀort that is chosen under full enforcement, denoted
by FE.
3.2 Comparing eﬀort under complete and incomplete enforcement
Under the strong assumption that the contract will be fully enforced, the seller would never
choose the outside option because a court would always force him to speciﬁcally perform the
contract. Yet, it is quite evident that full enforcement is only feasible if the contract fulﬁlls the
enforceability constraint, subject to which the buyer would still have to optimize. Consequently,














1 + πm − γδ
R v (20)
which yields
Proposition 2 Given Assumption 1, then e∗∗ R eFE if (1 − π)γδ R 1
Proposition 2 implies that a contract that ensures permanence under incomplete enforce-
ment is likely to lead to a distortion in the level of contracted eﬀort made by the seller. In
other words, the provision of permanence distorts the contract when enforcement is incom-
plete.16 The direction of distortion is dependent on the institutional framework determining
the enforceability of the contract in case of breach, i.e. the probability of enforcement γ, and
the scaling factor of contract damages, δ. In a full-enforcement setup, the seller’s eﬀort level
will be chosen under complete deterrence from opportunistic breach.17 This result is counter-
intuitive as one would expect that with increasing quality in, for example, the rule of law, our
results should converge towards the full enforcement level of eﬀort. Instead, an improvement
in enforceability of the contract distorts the seller’s eﬀort away from the full enforcement level.
Yet, it is to be kept in mind that both the enforceability and the permanence constraints are
16The case where enforcement would no longer be an issue is one where we could disregard the enforceability
constraint. This, the most eﬃcient case, could be characterised by a buyer and a seller integrated into a single
ﬁrm, denoted IR. Here, the possibility of higher outside opportunity costs would be taken into account. In this
case, the chosen eﬀort level, eIR, would be implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition:






comparing the second-best eﬀort level and the eﬀort under an integrated relationship, we ﬁnd
:
e∗∗ > (<) eIR ⇐⇒ (1 − π)m > (<)1
Hence, if this condition holds e is distorted upwards (downwards) with respect to the IR-level. Here, eﬀort
is larger than the level chosen in the integrated relationship when the marginal expected gross beneﬁt from the
outside option z(α) is larger than 1. Consequently, eﬃciency requires that e∗ will be chosen at the ﬁrst-best
level if the sum of the costs in α for both contract participants correspond exactly to the expected marginal
gross gain from the outside option in α. If, ceteris paribus, the incentives to breach the contract become larger,
i.e. the right hand side of the permanence constraint is raised through an increase in m, the buyer will increase
the contracted eﬀort level in order to raise the value of the conditional payment through an increase in q. If,
instead, the incentives to breach decrease, the contracted eﬀort can fall below the level eIR.
17In the full enforcement case, there is no need for the buyer to be concerned about ensuring permanence in
carbon sequestration. The seller always performs the contract regardless of the potential value of his outside
option.
17assumed to be binding. As a consequence, the expected marginal contract damages γδ are as-
sumed to be always signiﬁcantly lower than m, i.e. the level which would guarantee an ’a priori’
deterrence from breach. Taking these restrictions into account, the intuition for proposition 2 is
as follows. Given a stronger (yet not perfect) institutional framework, i.e. larger γδ, the buyer
has suﬃcient conﬁdence in the contract and would be willing to increase the upfront payment
α to the seller. The productive upfront payment increases the opportunity costs. Inspection of
the permanence constraint (7) shows that should these become too large then the buyer would
need to contract for a higher level of eﬀort (to produce q tons of carbon) in order to ensure
permanence. From Proposition 2, weaker institutional frameworks, i.e. smaller γδ, on the other
hand, would result in the contracted eﬀort being lower than the full-enforcement level. In turn,
however, the amount of carbon sequestered, along with the upfront payment are also lower.
4 Changes in the carbon market price
In Section 3 the Principal’s optimal contract structure was derived to show how a contract
could be designed to ensure permanence. However, it is important to understand how this
optimal contract might adjust given changes in exogenous factors. In particular, the buyer
may be motivated to purchase carbon oﬀsets at least partially on the basis of the international
equilibrium permit price, v. Recall from Section 2 that this can be interpreted as the buyer’s
marginal beneﬁt of not reducing own emissions, i.e. by oﬀsetting.
To begin the analysis, ﬁrst note that from (18) and invoking Assumption 1 that de∗∗
dv > 0.
Therefore changes in the carbon market price can be observed by changes in second-best optimal
eﬀort. From Proposition 1, the optimal upfront payment α∗∗ is unambiguously increasing in
an increase in the carbon market price (and thus an increase in the seller’s eﬀort). We now
investigate how the optimal contracted per-unit price β∗∗ changes.
Diﬀerentiating β∗∗ in Proposition (1) with respect to e∗∗ yields:
dβ∗∗
de∗∗ =
(C′(e) · q(α,e)) − (C(e) + (1 − π) · n) · qe(α,e∗∗)
q(α,e)2 (21)
To determine the sign of this derivative, we can ignore the denominator which is always
18positive. Rearranging yields:
dβ∗∗
de∗∗ R 0 ⇔
C′(e)





From this condition a ﬁrst conclusion can be drawn with respect to the relationship between
certiﬁcate price v and the conditional payment β. If the expected value of the seller’s alternative
to signing the contract (1−π)n is large enough then the optimal contract requires an increasing
β but only if v becomes larger. To see this, note that from (18) and Assumption 1 it follows
that an increase in in v leads to an unambiguous increase in e∗∗. If the seller’s expected outside
option (1 − π)n is large, the resulting change in seller’s costs e∗∗ would render the contract
unenforceable in the sense that (8) would be violated if the conditional payment β is not
increased as well. Further conclusions can be drawn when taking into account the value of β∗∗
and substituting (18) into (22), which yields
dβ∗∗
de∗∗ R 0 if and only if:
π ·
m − γδ





Note that under the given assumptions, the right hand side of this inequality is always
smaller than one. Therefore, simplifying (23), results in a suﬃcient condition for
dβ∗∗
de∗∗ > 0:
(1 − π)γδ > 1 (24)
Comparison of (24) with Proposition 2, and invoking Assumption 1, results in the following
proposition
Proposition 3 For strong institutional frameworks ((1 − π)γδ > 1), β∗∗ will be increasing in
v.
Under a speciﬁc set of institutional conditions, namely where there is a strong rule of law
and functioning legal system, i.e. large γδ, by deﬁnition leads to upward shifts in both e∗∗
and eFE. We also know from Proposition 2 that α, q and z will all increase. Proposition
3 states that, given these conditions, β∗∗ is increasing in v. The intuition is as follows. As
19e∗∗ increases, the change in the marginal production of carbon, qe, will be smaller than any
change in the seller’s marginal costs, C′(e) due to the convexity of the latter. Inspection of the
permanence constraint (7) and enforceability constraint (8) shows that for these to hold, the
conditional payment to the seller β must increase with increasing v. Our result implies that
where institutions are strong, the buyer could potentially index the optimal contract to changes
in the carbon market price in order to ensure permanence. Thus, as the carbon price increases,
the conditional payment could be raised and vice versa. However, our result would not apply
where institutions are particularly weak, which suggests that indexing might not work for oﬀset
contracts negotiated in many parts of the developing world.
5 Discussion
In this paper, a model is developed to investigate the role of incentives in forestry carbon
contracts in order to deal with two types of risk. First, we consider the quality of governance and
the enforcement of property rights in a given country; and second, changing opportunity costs
due to unpredictable changes in, for example, commodities’ prices such as palm oil and coﬀee.
The management of these types of risk may play an important role in ensuring permanence
in new carbon sinks, created as a consequence of contract implementation, e.g. by buyers and
sellers participating in the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM. Permanence has been and continues to be
an important topic for discussion at the international level with regards to forestry oﬀsets and
the role of forests in climate change (UNFCCC, 2007). While strategies to manage permanence
have been discussed at higher aggregate levels, e.g. at the national level (see Eliasch, 2008), or
an aggregate level concerning a number of farmers or landowners, this paper contributes to the
debate by considering incentives at the level of the contract in ensuring permanence in forestry
carbon sinks.
Current regulatory restrictions in the compliance markets aside, better permanence manage-
ment at the contractual level may encourage more carbon buyers not only to purchase forestry
oﬀsets but also in the kinds of countries where these risks are more prevalent. For example,
in the context of the CDM, oﬀset projects are implemented in non-Annex I countries, many
of which have large and economically-important agricultural sectors, widespread poverty and
weak systems of contract enforcement. The two types of risk of interest, institutional and eco-
20nomic, are modelled explicitly within the constraints on the buyer’s optimisation programme,
alongside one that limits the possible transfers between buyer and seller. Given that liability
for non-permanent oﬀsets in current compliance schemes are attributed to the buyer, the ob-
servable reluctance to provide upfront ﬁnance to poor country sellers is understandable. Note
that the buyer risks the loss of his investment if the seller decides to switch land use. Thus,
the buyer is by necessity interested in ensuring permanence than would otherwise be the case.
In our model this is reﬂected in the permanence constraint. This ensures that the carbon sink
persists even if enforcement is limited and the seller’s opportunity costs increase.
First, our model is solved for the optimal upfront and conditional payments (α, β), along
with the optimal penalty to be paid by the seller in case of contract breach (θ). These results
hold if the upfront investment has a large inﬂuence on the seller’s opportunity costs and if the
value of the certiﬁcates to the buyer, i.e. their market price, is high enough. As expected, the
optimal upfront payment increases with the quality of contract enforcement and the amount
of collateral the seller can bring into the contract. The value of the conditional payment is
mainly determined by the enforceability requirements to the contract, i.e. as determined by
the enforceability constraint, as well as the number of certiﬁcates achievable under the optimal
second-best eﬀort and the initial investment made. Under the given assumptions, contract
damages will always be chosen at their maximum level.
Second, our model emphasises the importance of provision of some positive level of upfront
payment in order to provide incentives to the seller to sequester carbon. This is contrary to the
message in the general payments for environmental services (PES) literature, which suggests
that to be eﬀective payments should only be made on condition of delivery of the service being
contracted (e.g. see Engel et al., 2008). Yet at least in the discussion on forestry carbon policy,
there are calls, e.g. by Dutschke and Angelsen (2008) and Jindal et al. (2008) among others, for
increasing the scope of upfront transfers made to landowners or farmers in addition to carbon
payments conditional on carbon sequestration. Implemented as a tool for risk sharing between
buyers and sellers, upfront payments tend to exist only in contracts of the kind established
by development-orientated institutions such as the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund, and not
in the commercial contracts that have evolved under the CDM. The far smaller voluntary
markets have witnessed wide experimentation in payment types and schedules. For example,
21in Mozambique, a tree planting carbon project that was launched in 2003 provided free seeds
and some training to farmers enrolling in the scheme (Palmer and Silber, 2009). In another
example, the International Small Group Tree Planting Programme (TIST) in Tanzania makes
upfront cash payments to farmers (Scurrah-Ehrhart, 2006). Larger upfront investments could
potentially enable the seller to acquire additional territory for aﬀorestation or reforestation,
which could lead to a scaling-up of AR activities. This is quite important in the context of
current global climate policy objectives. The fact that such a scale-up would increase the
incentive for opportunistic contract breach due to a higher value in opportunity costs is taken
into account in our model framework.
Third, we show that the optimal eﬀort level is distorted away from the full enforcement
case when permanence is considered by the buyer. Since we would expect eﬀort to converge
on the full-enforcement level with increasing quality in contract enforcement institutions, this
result seems counterintuitive. Given a higher-quality institutional framework, i.e. larger γδ,
the buyer is willing to increase the upfront payment to the seller. This, however, also increases
the seller’s opportunity cost. Should it become too large then the buyer would need to contract
for a higher level of eﬀort (to produce q) in order to ensure permanence. The trade-oﬀ is
clear. In exchange for guaranteed permanence in carbon sequestered, the seller would have
to expend more eﬀort in producing carbon in a country with better institutions than in one
with lower quality institutions. But, on the other hand less carbon would be produced in the
institutionally-constrained place and the upfront payment to the seller would also be lower
compared with the situation where institutions might be in better shape.
Therefore, to optimise the amount of carbon sequestered our results imply the need for
buyers to target potential sellers in countries with relatively good levels of governance, and
where institutions function relatively well. In our framework this is modelled as situations
where a higher probability of contract enforcement γ might be expected.18 The World Bank’s
‘Doing Business’ project attempts to measure the quality of business regulations and their
enforcement across 181 economies. One measure, ‘enforcing contracts’ ranks, for example, the
important forest nations of Brazil and Indonesia at 100th and 140th, respectively.19 These are
the kinds of countries that up to now have struggled to attract sequestration projects due at
18Note, however, that there may also be possibilities for improving the probability of contract enforcement
via policy measures that improve governance, for example by securing property rights and tenure for sellers.
19See: http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/?direction=Asc&sort=10.
22least in part to a lack of investors willing to provide upfront investments. Tanzania is ranked
at 33, which implies that contracts could be designed with a higher allocation of α than would
be the case, for example with Brazil, Indonesia or Mozambique (ranked 124). Furthermore,
higher upfront investments could be expected in countries where contract law allows for higher
levels of damages, i.e. a higher scaling factor δ.20
Fourth, we investigated how the optimal contract might change with changes in carbon
prices. Again, where institutions are strong we would expect to increase the conditional pay-
ment as the value of the marginal oﬀset increases. This implies that the buyer could potentially
index the conditional payment to carbon prices in order to ensure permanence. Note this result
does not hold where institutions are relatively weak, i.e. indexing is less likely to be eﬀective.
Thus, while price indexing could be implemented in countries such as Tanzania, it should per-
haps not be considered in places like Indonesia where enforcement institutions are particularly
weak. Also note that this result is contrary to the approach suggested by Benitez et al. (2006)
who advocated price indexing of payments but to the seller’s opportunity costs. Moreover, in
the speciﬁc case of forestry carbon oﬀset contracts, Dutschke and Angelsen (2008) recommend
that the risk of a change in commodity prices ex post to contracting could potentially be shared
between the carbon buyer and seller by including an indexing clause to commodities’ markets
in the contract. This would foresee additional payments during the times when the prices of,
for example, coﬀee or palm oil move outside a predetermined price corridor. Yet, it is unlikely
that the buyer is capable of (fully) observing actual changes in the seller’s opportunity costs.
If this is the case and given that we explicitly model for changes in opportunity costs via the
permanence constraint, our results suggest that an indexing clause to the international carbon
price might be preferred by a potential buyer than one indexed to the seller’s opportunity cost.
More explicit modelling of indexing through the dynamic extension of our simple contracting
problem to two periods would enable an analysis of the optimal contract to manage ex post
commodity price swings. This represents an interesting area for future research.
20In contrast to civil law the ‘penalty doctrine’ in case law, for example, does not allow for levels of damages
that are deemed ’punitive’ by the courts. Note, however, that penalty fees have rarely been agreed in forestry
carbon contracts implemented in developing countries. Project implementers in come cases might rely on
informal group sanctioning to ensure compliance (Matin Qaim, pers. comm.).
236 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a framework that models forest carbon contract incentives in the
context of price volatility in agricultural commodities’ markets and incomplete contract en-
forcement. Given the potential for landowners’ opportunity costs to change, we consider the
design of optimal carbon contracts to ensure landowner participation and hence, permanence in
the provision of forestry carbon beneﬁts over the duration of the contract. The buyer and seller
contract ex ante on an upfront payment along with a payment made conditional on carbon de-
livery. We model the upfront payment as a productive transfer, one that is not only productive
in carbon sequestration but also productive in the seller’s outside option. With the provision
of upfront payments, permanence can still be ensured even in a context of incomplete contract
enforcement. The optimal contract is driven by the quality of the institutional framework in
which the contract is executed, in particular as it relates to contract enforcement. We show
that a contract that ensures permanence under incomplete enforcement is likely to lead to a
distortion in the level of contracted eﬀort made by the seller. Stronger institutional frameworks
tend to distort the seller’s eﬀort upwards with respect to the full-enforcement outcome. This
also leads to greater amounts of carbon sequestered and higher payments made to the seller.
Further, where institutions are strong, there is a case for indexing the contract price to the
carbon market price if permanence is to be ensured. That is, as the carbon price increases, the
ex-post payment could be raised and vice versa.
The present model considers the implementation of activities to create new biomass, such
as forest maintenance or reforestation, that lead to the production of carbon credits that are
purchased ex-ante to project implementation, and where the seller’s eﬀort is known and con-
tractible. This raises two issues. First, regardless of market to which payments to sellers might
be indexed, the purchase of forestry carbon contracts at market prices ex ante to project im-
plementation (see EcoSecurities, 2008) implies that indexing would be problematic. At best,
it could involve a more eﬃcient allocation of rents in the carbon price, i.e. between upfront
and conditional payments made to the seller. Second, our model could potentially be extended
from one in which forests are utilized as carbon sinks to one that also considers them as a
source of GHG. In an extension to forest conservation and avoided deforestation (or Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, REDD), we might expect the seller’s eﬀort to
24be private information. Subject to moral hazard, the contract would need to be structured so
as to provide for a robust signal of the seller’s eﬀort in ensuring permanence of the natural
carbon sink. Upfront ﬁnancing would also be an important component of contracts for REDD
similar to the kind of contract discussed in this paper (see Dutschke and Angelsen, 2008).
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